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Improving Regulatory 
Accountability: 
Lessons from the Past and 
Prospects for the Future 
Susan E. Dudley† 
Abstract 
This Article examines efforts by the three branches of federal 
government to oversee regulatory policy and procedures. It begins with 
a review of efforts over the last century to establish appropriate checks 
and balances on regulations issued by the executive branch and then 
evaluates current regulatory reforms that would hold the executive 
branch, the legislative branch, and the judicial branch more 
accountable for regulations and their outcomes.  
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Introduction 
In the more than 125 years since Congress created the first 
regulatory body,1 the number of regulatory agencies and the scope and 
reach of the regulations they issue has increased significantly. In 2014, 
there were more than seventy federal agencies, employing almost 
300,000 people to write and implement regulation.2 Every year federal 
agencies issue tens of thousands of new regulations,3 which now occupy 
more than 175,000 pages of regulatory code. 4  For over a century, 
concerns over the accountability of what some have called the “fourth 
branch of government” have led all three branches of government to 
take steps to exercise checks and balances on the development and 
enforcement of regulations.5 
This Article examines efforts by the three branches of federal gov-
ernment to oversee regulatory policy and procedures. It begins with a 
review of efforts over the last century to establish appropriate checks 
and balances on regulations issued by the executive branch and then 
evaluates current regulatory reforms that would hold the executive 
branch, the legislative branch, and the judicial branch more account-
able for regulations and their outcomes.  
 
1. The Interstate Commerce Act established the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in 1887 to regulate railroad rates. Interstate Commerce Act, 
ch. 104, 24 Stat. 445 (1887).  
2. Susan Dudley & Melinda Warren, Economic Forms of Regula-
tion on the Rise: An Analysis of the U.S. Budget for Fiscal 
Years 2014 and 2015, at 2, 7 (2014), available at http://regulatory 
studies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/fi
les/downloads/2015_Regulators_Budget.pdf. Note that “[a]gencies that 
primarily perform taxation, entitlement, procurement, subsidy, and credit 
functions are excluded from this report,” so these figures exclude staff 
developing and administering regulations in the Internal Revenue Service, 
the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, etc. Id. at 14. 
3. Office of the Federal Register, Federal Register Pages Pub-
lished 1936–2013 (2014). 
4. Office of the Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations 
Page Breakdown: 1975 through 2013 (2014).  
5. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 
2253–69 (2001) (outlining nonpresidential mechanisms of controlling 
agencies and presidential administration of agencies generally). 
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I. Evolution of Executive Discretion Regarding 
Regulatory Policy and Practice in the United States 
We begin with a review of the evolution of regulatory policy in the 
United States, from the establishment of the first regulatory agencies 
in the late nineteenth century, to the passage of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) of 1946,6 to the economic deregulation of the 
1970s and ’80s, to the growth in health, safety, and environmental 
regulations since then, which has led to increased emphasis on executive 
branch oversight, congressional reforms, and judicial review.  
A. Early Regulatory Agencies and the 
Delegation of Legislative Authority 
Congress established the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), 
the first regulatory agency, in 1887 to regulate railroad rates.7 The ICC 
was an independent, bipartisan commission of seven members, which 
reached decisions through an adjudicatory approach. Over the next 
several decades, this model served as the basis for subsequent regulatory 
commissions, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (1914), 
the Water Power Commission (1920) (later the Federal Power 
Commission), and the Federal Radio Commission (1927) (later the 
Federal Communications Commission (or FCC)); Congress also created 
other agencies to regulate commercial and financial systems, including 
the Federal Reserve Board (1913), the Tariff Commission (1916), the 
Packers and Stockyards Administration (1916), and the Commodities 
Exchange Authority (1922).8 Most of these early agencies were estab-
lished as independent regulatory commissions outside executive depart-
ments9 and were structured to be more independent of presidential 
control.10 Their members could only be dismissed for good cause (“inef-
ficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”)11 in contrast to 
political appointees in executive departments, who serve “at the 
pleasure of the president”12 and can be fired for any reason.  
 
6. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2012).  
7. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 445 (1887).  
8. Office of Management and Budget, Report to Congress on the 
Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations (1997) [hereinafter 
OMB 1997]. 
9. For example, the Packers and Stockyards Administration was established 
within the Department of Agriculture. Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, 
7 U.S.C. § 181 (2012). 
10. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency 
Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 615–19 (2010). 
11. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 623 (1935). 
12. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 190 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
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During this period, courts interpreted the separation of powers 
implicit in Articles I–III of the U.S. Constitution as prohibiting the 
delegation of legislative powers to the executive. Early cases held that 
limited delegation was permissible as long as the executive branch was 
merely “fill[ing] up the details.” 13  “That Congress cannot delegate 
legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized 
as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government 
ordained by the Constitution.”14 
By 1928, however, the Supreme Court softened its strict interp-
retation of the nondelegation doctrine in a decision that found that a 
congressional delegation of power was constitutional because the sta-
tute included an “intelligible principle” to guide executive action.15  
In the 1930s, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal 
brought an increase in the number of government regulatory agencies, 
including the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (1931), the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board (1932), the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC) (1933), the Commodity Credit Corporation (1933), 
the Farm Credit Administration (1933), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) (1934), and the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) (1935).16 The jurisdiction of other agencies, including the ICC, 
the FCC, and the FDA, expanded during this period.17 The Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 18  created a new agency, now called the 
Employment Standards Administration, in the Department of Labor 
(DOL).19  
The sweeping powers of these new regulatory agencies led to 
concerns over the constitutionality of congressional delegation to a 
“fourth branch” of government.20 In 1935, the Supreme Court weighed 
 
13. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825). 
14. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). 
15. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
16. OMB 1997, supra note 8. 
17. Id. 
18.  Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 201–219 (2012)).  
19. OMB 1997, supra note 8. 
20. Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent 
Regulatory Process, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 461, 485–86 (1994) (quoting 
Robert E. Cushman, The Problem of the Independent 
Regulatory Commissions, reprinted in, The President’s Committee 
on Administrative Management, Report of the Committee with 
Studies of Administrative Management in the Federal 
Government 205–43 (1937)).  
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in with a ruling that the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)21 
was unconstitutional because it provided the President (and private 
industry associations) “virtually unfettered” decision-making power.22  
B. Procedural Reform and the Administrative Procedure Act 
Concern that agency “power was not sufficiently safeguarded and 
sometimes was put to arbitrary and biased use”23 led both Congress and 
the Executive Branch to conduct extensive reviews of agency conduct.24 
Years of debate culminated in the passage of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) in 1946.  
According to one researcher, the APA reflected a “fierce compro-
mise”: 
The battle over the APA helped to resolve the conflict between 
bureaucratic efficiency and the rule of law, and permitted the 
continued growth of government regulation. The APA expressed 
the nation’s decision to permit extensive government, but to 
avoid dictatorship and central planning.25  
The APA established procedures an agency must follow to promulgate 
binding rules and regulations within the area delegated to it by statute. 
As long as executive branch agencies act within the rulemaking 
authority delegated to them by Congress, and follow the procedures in 
the APA, recent courts have not found it unconstitutional for them to 
write and enforce regulations.26 
 
21. Pub. L. 73–67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), invalidated by A. L. A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  
22. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 
(1935). 
23. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37 (1950) (citing Elihu Root, 
Public Service by the Bar, 39 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 355, 368 (1916)); Charles 
E. Hughes, Some Aspects of the Development of American Law, 39 Proc. 
of the Ann. Meeting of the N.Y.B.A. 266, 269 (1916); George 
Sutherland, Private Rights and Government Control, 40 Ann. Rep. 
A.B.A. 197, 205 (1917); President Guthrie, Judicial Powers by 
Administrative Boards and the Creation of Administrative Courts, 46 
Proc. of the Ann. Meeting of the N.Y.B.A. 169, 186 (1923).  
24. E.g., APA at 65: Is Reform Needed to Create Jobs, Promote Economic 
Growth, and Reduce Costs? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 25–27 (2011) (statement of Jeffery A. Rosen, Kirkland & Ellis LLP) 
[hereinafter Is Reform Needed].  
25. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure 
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557, 1559 
(1996). 
26. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
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While some constitutional scholars still debate the question of 
delegation,27 recent Supreme Court cases have not overturned legisla-
tion or regulation on nondelegation grounds. In 1989, the Supreme 
Court opined: 
In our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing 
and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general 
directives.28 
Congress has supplemented the APA through legislation tailored to 
specific programs and passed government-wide procedural laws (e.g., 
the Freedom of Information Act of 1966,29 and the Government in the 
Sunshine Act of 197630).31 However, the APA has guided executive 
branch rulemaking without significant amendment for more than sixty-
five years and is one of the most important pieces of legislation ever 
enacted.32  
C. Removal of Economic Regulation 
The regulatory agencies formed during the New Deal and earlier 
generally issued “economic regulations.” That is, they regulated a broad 
array of activities within particular industries using economic controls 
such as price ceilings or floors, quantity restrictions, and service 
parameters. 33  Economic regulation is often justified by concerns of 
“market power” or “natural monopoly”—where a market can be served 
at lowest cost with a single supplier.34  
 
27. E.g., David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My 
Critics, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 731 (1999); Paul Craig Roberts, How the 
Law Was Lost, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 853 (1999). 
28. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); see also Whitman 
v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment) (arguing that agency rulemaking 
authority is legislative power). 
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).  
30. Id. § 552(b). 
31. See Jeffrey Lubbers, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking 
(5th ed. 2012) (discussing generally the creation of programs to 
supplement the APA). 
32. Is Reform Needed, supra note 24.  
33. See Murray L. Weidenbaum, Business and Government in the 
Global Marketplace 23–41 (6th ed. 1999) (discussing the development 
and rationale of U.S. regulation). 
34. See W. Kip Viscusi, John M. Vernon & Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 
Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 356–57 (Mass. Inst. Tech. 
4th ed. 2005) (1992) (discussing the regulation of natural monopolies). 
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Though established as independent commissions to avoid political 
influence,35 observers began to be concerned that these agencies were 
“captured” by the industries they regulated. By the early 1970s, 
scholarship in the fields of economics, antitrust, and law generally 
supported the idea that regulation of private sector prices, entry, and 
exit tended to keep prices higher than necessary, to the benefit of 
regulated industries, and at the expense of consumers.36 Policy entre-
preneurs in the Ford, Carter, and Reagan Administrations, in Congress, 
and at think tanks were able to link this knowledge to the problem of 
inflation by showing that eliminating economic regulations and 
fostering competition would lead to reduced prices.37 Bipartisan efforts 
across all three branches of government eventually led to the abolition 
of whole agencies such as the Civil Aeronautics Board and the ICC, 
and removal of unnecessary regulation in several previously regulated 
industries, with resulting improvements in innovation and consumer 
welfare.38  
The transportation and telecommunications deregulation that took 
place in the 1970s and 1980s is generally regarded as a success, having 
lowered consumer prices and increased choices. Deregulation and 
consumer choice have aligned service quality with customer preferences. 
Competitive markets have generated real gains—and not just 
reallocated benefits—for consumers and society as a whole, and markets 
have evolved in beneficial ways that were not anticipated before 
deregulation.39 
D. Growth in Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation 
At the same time that economic forms of regulation were declining, 
a new type of regulation began to emerge, aimed at protecting 
consumers, environmental quality, and workplace safety. Many of these 
new regulatory agencies were established as part of the executive 
branch, either in departments, such as the newly formed Department 
 
35. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935) (noting 
that Congress created the Federal Trade Commission as an independent 
agency because “it was essential that the commission should not be open 
to the suspicion of partisan direction”).  
36. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. 
& Mgmt. Sci. 3, 3 (1971). 
37. Susan E. Dudley, Alfred Kahn 1917–2010, Regulation, Spring 2011, at 8. 
38. Martha Derthick & Paul J. Quirk, The Politics of Deregula-
tion 5 (1985); ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–88, § 101, 
109 Stat. 803, 804 (1995). 
39. Clifford Winston, U.S. Industry Adjustment to Economic Deregulation, 
12 J. Econ. Persp., 89, 89–90, 97 (1998). 
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of Transportation (DOT) (1967),40 or as standalone agencies, such as 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (1970). 41  Unlike the 
economic regulatory agencies created earlier, these new agencies had 
the power to regulate across industry boundaries and affect industrial 
processes, product designs, and by-products.42  
Safety regulatory agencies established within the DOT included the 
Federal Highway Administration (established in 1966 to set highway 
and truck safety standards), the Federal Railroad Administration 
(established in 1966 to issue rail safety standards), and the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (established in 1970 to set pass-
enger vehicle standards).43  
Congress expanded the newly created EPA’s authorities through 
the Clean Air Act (1970), the Clean Water Act (1972), the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act (1974), the Toxic Substances Control Act (1976), and 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1976).44  
Congress also created the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration (1970) as part of DOL and expanded mine safety and health 
regulation.45 Other labor-related regulations were authorized through 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and the Pension and 
Welfare Administration, “established in 1974 to administer and 
regulate pension plan insurance systems.”46 During the same period, 
Congress established several independent regulatory agencies, including 
the National Credit Union Administration (1970), the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (1972), the Nuclear Regulatory Commiss-
ion (1973), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (1977).47 
E. Executive Controls on Regulation 
Concerns over the burden of these new regulations and other re-
porting requirements led President Carter (building on efforts of Pres-
idents Nixon and Ford before him) to create procedures for analyzing 
 
40. Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 102 (2012)).  
41. David M. Bearden et al., Cong. Research Serv., RL 30798, Environmental 
Laws: Summaries of Major Statutes Administered by the Environmental 
Protection Agency 1 (2013).  
42. See WEIDENBAUM, supra note 33 (comparing the “old method” of 
regulations, which were more industry specific, with the “new method” of 
regulations, where agencies have broader jurisdiction).  
43. OMB 1997, supra note 8. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
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the impact of new regulations and minimizing their burdens.48 They 
also led to the passage of two significant pieces of legislation in 1980. 
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)49 required agencies to analyze 
the impact of their regulatory actions on small entities and consider 
effective alternatives that minimize small entity impacts. The Paper-
work Reduction Act (PRA) of 198050 established the Office of Informa-
tion and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) to review and approve all new reporting requirements 
with an eye toward minimizing burdens associated with the 
government’s collection of information.  
When President Reagan took office in 1981, he continued to pare 
back economic regulations, and through Executive Order 12,291,51 he 
gave the newly created OIRA a role in reviewing draft regulations to 
ensure their benefits exceeded their costs. Executive Order 12,498,52 
issued in 1985, established a Regulatory Program of the most significant 
upcoming regulations, published annually to “improve the management 
of regulatory activity within the Executive branch” and “provide the 
public and the Congress with a greater opportunity to learn about and 
evaluate . . . regulatory priorities and procedures.”53 Each subsequent 
president has continued and expanded OIRA’s central regulatory 
oversight role,54 if not its budget.55 
President George H.W. Bush continued to operate under President 
Reagan’s executive orders, and when President Clinton took office in 
1993, he replaced them with E.O. 12,866,56 which remains in effect 
today. E.O. 12,866 retained OIRA’s review of significant new 
 
48. President Carter’s E.O. 12,044 required agency heads to determine the 
need for a regulation, evaluate the direct and indirect effects of alterna-
tives, and choose the least burdensome. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 
152 (1979). 
49. Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) [hereinafter Regulatory 
Flexibility Act]. 
50. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980). 
51. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).  
52. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986).  
53. Message to the Congress on the Regulatory Program of the United States 
Government, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1066 (Aug. 7, 1986).  
54. Susan E. Dudley, Observations on OIRA’s Thirtieth Anniversary, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 113, 114–15, 127 (2011). 
55. See Kathryn Vesey, OIRA Celebrates 30th Anniversary, The George 
Wash. Univ. Reg. Studies Ctr. (June 28, 2011), https://regulatory 
studies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/fi
les/downloads/20110628_oira_staffing.pdf (describing the budgetary and 
staffing constraints of OIRA). 
56. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).  
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regulations57 and reinforced the philosophy that regulations should be 
based on an analysis of the costs and benefits of all available alterna-
tives and that agencies should select regulatory approaches that maxi-
mize net benefits to society unless otherwise constrained by law.58 Pres-
ident George W. Bush and President Obama have continued these 
policies and procedures. President Obama’s recent reforms are discussed 
in the next section. In addition, over the last three decades, OIRA has 
issued several bulletins and memoranda elaborating on these executive 
orders, including OMB Circular A-4 providing agency guidance on 
preparing regulatory impact analysis, 59  bulletins articulating good 
practices for guidance documents,60 data quality,61 and peer review,62 
principles for risk analysis,63 and others.64 The table below lists the 
executive orders that have guided regulatory development and 
presidential oversight since 1978. 
 
57. Executive Order 12,866 limited OIRA review to “significant” regulations 
but provides the OIRA with some room to determine what falls into that 
definition. Id. at 644–48.  
58. See id. at 638–39 (stating the regulatory philosophy and principles that 
federal agencies should keep in mind when promulgating regulations).  
59. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB 
Circular No. A-4, Regulatory Analysis (2003).  
60. Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 
3440 (Jan. 25, 2007). 
61. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, 
and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002). 
62. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB 
MEMO NO. M-05-03, Issuance of OMB’s “Final Information 
Quality Bulletin for Peer Review” (2004). 
63. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB 
Memo No. M-07-24, Updated Principles for Risk Analysis (2007). 
64. OIRA’s website provides links to guidance for regulatory departments and 
agencies when developing and reviewing regulations. OIRA–For Agencies, 
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/omb/inforeg_regpol_agency_review/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015). 
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Executive Orders on Regulatory Analysis and Oversight65 
Executive 
Order Title Administration
Date 
Signed 
EO 12,04466 
“Improving Government 
Regulations” 
(revoked by EO 12,291)
Carter March 23, 1978 
EO 12,17467 “Paperwork” (revoked by EO 12,291) Carter 
November 
30, 1979 
EO 12,29168 “Federal Regulation” (revoked by EO 12,866) Reagan 
February 17, 
1981
EO 12,49869 
“Regulatory Planning 
Process” 
(revoked by EO 12,866)
Reagan January 4, 1985 
EO 12,86670 
“Regulatory Planning 
and Review” 
(amended by EO 13,258)
Clinton September 30, 1993 
EO 13,25871 
“Amending Executive Order 
12866 on Regulatory 
Planning and Review” 
(revoked by EO 13,497)
G.W. Bush February 26, 2002 
EO 13,42272 
“Further Amendment to 
Executive Order 12866 on 
Regulatory Planning 
and Review” 
(revoked by EO 13,497)
G.W. Bush January 18, 2007 
EO 13,49773 
“Revocation of Certain 
Executive Orders 
Concerning Regulatory 
Planning and Review”
Obama January 30, 2009 
 
65. Regulation 101, George Wash. Univ. Reg. Studies Ctr., http://reg 
ulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/regulation-101#ExecutiveOrders (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
66. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979). 
67. Exec. Order No. 12,174, 3 C.F.R. 462 (1980).  
68. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127(1982). 
69. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986). 
70. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).  
71. Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2003).  
72. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008).  
73. Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010).  
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EO 13,56374 “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review” Obama 
January 18, 
2011
EO 13,57975 
“Regulation and 
Independent Regulatory 
Agencies”
Obama July 11, 2011 
EO 13,61076 “Identifying and Reducing Regulatory Burdens” Obama 
May 10, 
2012
 
While these executive branch efforts have done little to slow the 
growth in new regulation,77 they have focused attention on understand-
ing the effects of regulations, and some argue they have resulted in 
“smarter regulation” that produces more benefits than costs.78 
F. Congressional Efforts at Regulatory Reform  
Political scientists agree that Congress has “an ‘awesome arsenal’ 
of weapons” 79  to control agencies’ actions, including “legislation, 
appropriations, hearings, investigations, personal interventions, and 
‘friendly advice’ that is ignored at an executive’s peril.”80 James Q. 
Wilson used an analogy to explain the two main ways Congress 
exercises control over federal agencies. One is through authorizing 
legislation, which he characterized as “architectural; the life of an 
agency is constrained by its need to live within a certain space, move 
along prescribed corridors, and operate specified appliances.”81  The 
 
74. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012).  
75. Exec. Order No. 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256 (2012).  
76. Exec. Order No. 13,610, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2013).  
77. The GW Regulatory Studies Center maintains various statistics on regu-
latory activity, including pages of regulatory code, on-budget costs and 
personnel at regulatory agencies, numbers of regulations, etc. Reg Stats, 
GEORGE WASH. UNIV. REG. STUDIES CTR., http://regulatorystudies. 
columbian.gwu.edu/reg-stats (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).  
78. See, e.g., John D. Graham, Paul R. Noe & Elizabeth L. Branch, Managing 
the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 953 (2006) (explaining how President George W. 
Bush’s administration used a “smart regulation” approach that evaluated 
regulations using multiple disciplines); Cass Sunstein, Smarter 
Regulation: Remarks from Cass Sunstein, Administrator, Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 7 (2011) (de-
scribing President Obama’s approach to federal regulation and the pur-
pose of the regulatory system). 
79. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy 236 (1989) (citing Herbert Kaufman, 
The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs 164 
(1981)). 
80. Id.  
81. Id.  
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other is like “fire fighting; when an alarm goes off signaling that an 
agency may be violating some congressional interest, members of Con-
gress rush in to put out the fire.”82 Until the Supreme Court struck the 
legislative veto down in 1983,83 Congress used its architectural powers 
to insert legislative veto provisions in more than two hundred statutes, 
allowing one or both houses or their relevant committees to disapprove, 
without the President’s signature, an agency’s exercise of delegated 
authority.84  
Despite these powers, the legislative branch has been less active 
than the executive branch in exerting concerted oversight over the 
regulatory process.85 In 1995, a Republican majority took control of 
both houses of Congress, having run on a platform that included 
regulatory reform. By this time, the social regulations (addressing 
health, safety, and environmental issues) that had begun in the 1970s 
were the focus of concern. In contrast to the consensus on economic 
regulations, academics and policy makers did not generally support 
outright deregulation, but rather reforms to make regulations less bur-
densome and more cost-beneficial. 
The 104th Congress announced an ambitious agenda that included 
efforts to codify regulatory impact analysis procedures similar to those 
required through executive order, to require compensation for 
regulatory actions that reduced the value of property rights, to cap the 
costs of new regulations through a regulatory budget, and to give 
Congress more control and accountability over the content of new 
regulations.86  
These efforts at comprehensive regulatory reform legislation in the 
104th Congress failed to win a majority of votes, but some targeted 
efforts became law, including these: 
 The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) of 1995,87 which 
required executive branch agencies to estimate and try to 
minimize burdens on state, local, and tribal governments, and 
private entities, 
 
82. Id. 
83. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that the congressional 
veto provision in Immigration and Nationality Act is unconstitutional). 
84. Wilson, supra note 79, at 243. 
85. Kagan, supra note 5, at 2257 (noting that Congress used its veto powers 
rarely). 
86. Susan E. Dudley, Administrative Law & Regulation: Prospects for Regu-
latory Reform in 2011, 12 Engage 7, 7 (2011). 
87. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995). 
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 The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 
(SBREFA) of 1996,88 which reinforced RFA requirements for 
small business impact analyses and provided for judicial review 
of agencies’ determinations as to whether regulations would 
have “a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities,”89  
 The Congressional Review Act (CRA) of 1996,90 contained in 
SBREFA and passed in response to the loss of the legislative 
veto, which required agencies to submit final regulations with 
supporting documentation to both houses of Congress, and es-
tablished expedited procedures by which Congress could over-
turn regulations within a specified time using a Joint Res-
olution of Disapproval,  
 1995 Amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act,91 which 
reauthorized OIRA and required further reductions in paper-
work burdens, and 
 Title VI, Section 645, of the Omnibus Consolidated Approp-
riations Act of 1997,92 which directed OMB to submit a report 
to Congress estimating the costs and benefits of major regu-
lations, and offer recommendations for reform. The Consoli-
dated Appropriations Act of 2001 93  made permanent this 
requirement for OMB to report to Congress annually.94 
These efforts have had mixed results. Agencies generally meet 
UMRA requirements with reference to regulatory impact analyses 
prepared pursuant to Executive Order 12,866 but rarely do more.95 
 
88. Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996). 
89. Id. at 865–66.  
90. Id. at 868–69.  
91. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 
(1995).  
92. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–366 (1996). 
93. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).  
94. Id. at 2763A–161. The 104th Congress also passed amendments to the 
Safe Drinking Water Act, directing the Environmental Protection Agency 
to set standards based on a balancing of costs and benefits. Safe Drinking 
Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 
(1996). 
95. See Unfunded Mandates and Regulatory Overreach: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and 
Procurement Reform of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 
112th Cong. 11 (2011) (statement of Susan E. Dudley, George 
Washington Univ. Reg. Studies Ctr.) [hereinafter Dudley, Unfunded 
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While pursuant to SBREFA, courts have overturned regulations that 
fail to consider impacts on small business,96 agencies have successfully 
defended regulations that ignore the RFA requirements if the regula-
tion’s effects on small entities are considered to be “indirect.”97  
“Congress has used the CRA to enact a resolution of disapproval 
only once, overturning an OSHA regulation addressing ergonomics in 
the workplace.”98  Though resolutions of disapproval require only a 
simple majority in Congress (and several have passed one house), they 
face the threat of presidential veto, which would require a two-thirds 
majority to override. The conditions surrounding the ergonomics regu-
lation were likely key to its disapproval. It was a “midnight regulation,” 
issued amid much controversy at the end of the Clinton Administration. 
The resolution disapproving the rule came at the beginning of the Bush 
Administration (which did not support the rule), eliminating the veto 
threat. Although it has only nullified one action using the CRA, 
Congress has introduced dozens of resolutions of disapproval,99 and in 
some instances, the threat of passage of a resolution of disapproval may 
have compelled agencies to modify regulatory actions.100 
 
Mandates] (discussing the shortcomings of UMRA for its limited coverage 
of regulations and inadequate requirement for agency analysis). 
96. See Nw. Mining Ass’n v. Babbitt, 5 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1998) (recog-
nizing private business’ rights to be informed when their interests are at 
stake by government regulations and to participate in the regulatory 
process); S. Offshore Fishing Ass’n v. Daley, 995 F. Supp. 1411 (M.D. 
Fla. 1998) (striking down a fishery management plan for failing to con-
sider economic effects on small businesses required by RFA).  
97. American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1043–45 (D.C. Cir. 
1999); see also Jeffrey J. Polich, Judicial Review and the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act: An Early Examination of When 
and Where Judges Are Using Their Newly Granted Power over Federal 
Regulatory Agencies, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1425, 1449 (2000) (dis-
cussing cases where the regulations were upheld by courts). 
98. APA at 65: Is Reform Needed to Create Jobs, Promote Economic Growth, 
and Reduce Costs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial 
and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 14 (2011) 
(statement of Susan E. Dudley, George Wash. Univ. Reg. Studies Ctr.); 
see also Richard S. Beth, Cong. Research Serv., RL31160, 
Disapproval of Regulations by Congress: Procedure Under the 
Congressional Review Act 9 (2001) (giving the details on both the 
Senate’s and the House’s disproval of the rule submitted by OSHA). 
99. Congressional Review Act FAQs, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, 
http://www.gao.gov/legal/congressact/cra_faq.html (last visited Feb. 7, 
2015). 
100. Steven J. Balla, Legislative Organization and Congressional Review of 
Agency Regulations, 16 J.L. Econ. & Org. 424, 429 (2000). 
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Pursuant to the Regulatory Right to Know Act,101 OMB does re-
port annually to Congress on the costs and benefits of major regula-
tions,102 but a 2001 Congressional Research Service report observed that 
OMB’s reports “have been incomplete, and its benefits estimates have 
been questioned.”103  The General Accounting Office104  and others105 
have noted that it is difficult for OMB to report objectively on 
estimates of regulatory benefits and costs. 
II. Executive Branch Oversight of Regulation 
A. President Obama’s Initiatives 
Like presidents before him, President Obama has reinforced and 
expanded the principles and practices of regulatory analysis and exec-
utive oversight. He retained OIRA, and its staff of fewer than fifty 
career civil servants who operate within the Executive Office of the 
President, reviewing regulations to ensure they are consistent with the 
President’s priorities, and coordinating interagency review to avoid 
redundancy and conflict.106 With its mission to ensure that regulations’ 
benefits justify their costs, OIRA plays an important role. It is 
institutionally more interested in impacts on society broadly and less 
susceptible to special interest pressures than line agencies,107 and pro-
vides what President Obama has called “a dispassionate and analytical 
‘second opinion’ on agency actions.”108  
 
101. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 624, 114 Stat. 2763A-161 (2000). 31 U.S.C. § 1105, 
Annual Statement and Report on Rules and Regulations (2012).  
102. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, OIRA Reports to Congress, The 
White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_regpol_repor
ts_congress/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
103. Rogelio Garcia, Cong. Research Serv., IB95035, Federal Regu-
latory Reform: An Overview 11 (2001). 
104. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO/GGD-99-59, Regula-
tory Accounting: Analysis of OMB’s Reports on the Costs and 
Benefits of Federal Regulation 56 (1999) [hereinafter GAO, 
Analysis of OMB’s Reports].  
105. Susan E. Dudley, Perpetuating Puffery: An Analysis of the Composition 
of OMB’s Reported Benefits of Regulation, 47 Bus. Econ. 165, 175 (2012). 
106. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, About OIRA, The White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_administrator (last visited Feb. 7, 
2015). 
107. Susan E. Dudley, Regulatory Reform: Lessons Learned, Challenges 
Ahead, Regulation, Summer 2009, at 6. 
108. Memorandum on Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 5977 (Feb. 3, 2009). 
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On January 18, 2011, the President published an op-ed in the Wall 
Street Journal109 outlining his approach to regulation and issued a new 
executive order. Executive Order 13,563 on “Improving Regulation and 
Regulatory Review” reaffirmed the principles and practices that have 
been in effect since 1981.110 It reinforced President Clinton’s Executive 
Order 12,866 and stressed the importance of conducting sound analysis 
of likely regulatory impacts, of providing public opportunities to engage 
in the process of developing new regulations, and of designing less 
burdensome, more flexible approaches to achieve regulatory goals. It 
also required agencies to develop plans for periodically reviewing 
regulations already on the books, with an eye toward streamlining, 
repealing, or expanding them to make them more effective and less 
burdensome. 
President Obama ventured further than previous presidents in 
issuing E.O. 13,579 in July 2011, encouraging independent regulatory 
agencies to comply with E.O. 13,563 requirements “concerning public 
participation, integration and innovation, flexible approaches, and 
science,” to the extent permitted by law. 111 E.O. 13,579 also said that 
these “agencies should consider how best to promote retrospective anal-
ysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or 
excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal 
them in accordance with what has been learned,” and make such 
information public.112 
E.O. 13,610, issued in May 2012, focused on “Identifying and 
Reducing Regulatory Burdens.” 113 It directed agencies to engage the 
public in their retrospective review of existing regulations, prioritize 
reviews that would produce significant quantifiable savings, and report 
regularly to OIRA on the progress of their initiatives.114  
B. 113th Congress Proposals for Executive Branch Controls 
The 113th Congress considered various regulatory reform proposals 
designed to give the executive branch more responsibility for ensuring 
 
109. Barack Obama, Op-Ed., Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, 
Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 2011, at A17. 
110. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: The President’s 
Regulatory Strategy, (Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://www.white 
house.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/18/fact-sheet-presidents-regulatory-
strategy. 
111. Exec. Order No. 13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256 (2012).  
112. Id. at 257.  
113. Exec. Order No. 13,610, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2013).  
114. Id. at 259.  
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new regulations meet procedural and analytical requirements.115 None 
of these were enacted into law, but the concepts behind them may serve 
as the foundation for future initiatives.  
1. Enhanced Regulatory Impact Analysis 
Several bills focused on codifying requirements for regulatory 
impact analysis of proposed regulations.116 As discussed above, presi-
dents of both parties over the last thirty years have issued executive 
orders articulating nearly identical regulatory analysis principles to 
guide regulatory decisions, and at least since 1980, there have been 
attempts to codify these executive requirements in statute.117  
Though the creation of a statutory obligation for meeting these 
regulatory impact analysis standards is probably not necessary to 
ensure that future presidents continue to endorse them, codifying the 
requirements could have several advantages. First, such legislation 
would lend congressional support to the nonpartisan principles and the 
philosophy that before issuing regulations agencies should identify a 
compelling public need, evaluate the likely effects of alternative 
regulatory approaches, and select the alternative that provides the 
greatest net benefit to Americans.118 The Sound Regulation Act,119 and 
 
115. See Reg. Studies Ctr., Regulatory Reform Bills, 113th Congress, 
George Wash. U., http://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/regul
atory-reform-bills-113th-congress (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
116. See, e.g., Restoring Honesty for Our Economy Act, S. 786, 113th Cong. 
(2013) (requiring “agencies to quantify costs associated with proposed 
economically significant regulations”); Sound Regulation Act of 2014, S. 
2099, 113th Cong. (2014) (placing more emphasis on the benefit-cost 
analysis developed to support regulations).  
117. 1980 Economic Report of the President 125 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 
Economic Report]. 
118. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (“Federal agencies should 
promulgate only such regulations as are required by law, are necessary to 
interpret the law, or are made necessary by compelling public need, such 
as material failures of private markets to protect or improve the health 
and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being of the 
American people. In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies 
should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, 
including the alternative of not regulating. Costs and benefits shall be 
understood to include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent 
that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs 
and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to 
consider. Further, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, 
agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits 
(including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, 
and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute 
requires another regulatory approach.”). 
119. H.R. 3863, 113th Cong. (2014). 
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the Jumpstarting Opportunities with Bold Solutions Act120 would have 
required federal agencies to identify “the nature and significance of the 
market failure, regulatory failure, or other problem that necessitates 
regulatory action and why other alternatives, such as market forces 
or state or local regulations, could not address the problem better than 
federal regulation,” 121  and “develop at least 3 distinct regulatory 
options, in addition to not regulating, that the agency estimates will 
provide the greatest benefits for the least cost in meeting the regulatory 
objective,”122 among other analytical steps.  
Second, legislation could apply these requirements to independent 
agencies (which administrations have been reluctant to do through 
executive order for fear of stirring up debate over the relationship 
between independent agencies and the President). For example, 
Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2013123 would allow 
the president by executive order to subject independent regulatory 
agencies to the executive analytical requirements applicable to other 
agencies. Several bills also attempted to impose analytical requirements 
on specific independent agencies, such as the FCC, 124  and the 
independent financial regulatory agencies. 125  When gathered at the 
OIRA 30th Anniversary conference hosted by the GW Regulatory 
Studies Center and the Administrative Law Review, former OIRA 
administrators of both parties agreed on the importance of engaging 
independent regulatory agencies in regulatory analysis and oversight.126  
Third, Congress could make compliance with them judicially re-
viewable.127  
Additionally, some bills emphasize certain features that members 
have found lacking in existing regulatory analysis requirements. For 
example, the small business community has been frustrated that courts 
have interpreted the RFA’s requirements to assess economic impact as 
applying only to direct compliance costs. They argue that agencies 
should consider reasonably foreseeable indirect economic impacts on 
 
120. H.R. 4304, 113th Cong. (2014).  
121. H.R. 3863 (CRS bill summary); H.R. 4304.  
122. H.R. 3863 § 3(f)(1)(C).  
123. S. 1173, 113th Cong. (2013).  
124. Federal Communications Commission Process Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 
3675, 113th Cong. (2014); FCC “ABCs” Act of 2013, H.R. 2649, 113th 
Cong. (2013); Federal Communications Commission Process Reform Act 
of 2014, S. 1989, 113th Cong. (2014).  
125. SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 1062, 113th Cong. (2013); 
Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2013, S. 450, 113th Cong. (2013).  
126. Symposium, OIRA Thirtieth Anniversary Conference, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 
1, 6 (2011).  
127. See discussion infra Part IV.  
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small entities, such as increases in input prices (e.g., electricity, natural 
gas, or transportation) or state-level regulations issued pursuant to 
federal rules. This latter issue is particularly important for 
environmental regulations, where the “duty of regulating is passed on 
to the States . . . without any corresponding analysis or requirements 
for States to consider less burdensome alternatives for small 
business.” 128  The Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act 129  would 
have amended the RFA to include “any indirect economic effect on 
small entities which is reasonably foreseeable.”130 
The analytical requirements of Title II of Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act (UMRA)131 are similar to those in Executive Order 12,866. 
They both ask executive branch agencies to “assess the effects of 
Federal regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal governments, and 
the private sector”132 and “select the least costly, most cost-effective or 
least burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule.”133 
But UMRA’s coverage is much more limited than that of the Executive 
Order.134 According to a CRS report, 72 percent of the economically 
significant rules covered by the Executive Order are not covered by 
UMRA. 135  This limited coverage is compounded by the fact that 
UMRA’s requirements for analyzing the effects of proposed regulations 
are largely informational, and judicial review does not impose 
meaningful consequences for noncompliance. A bill introduced in the 
113th Congress, H.R. 899, would have provided more detailed criteria 
 
128. Legislation to Improve the Regulatory Flexibility Act Before the H. Comm. 
on Small Bus., 110th Cong. 5 (2007) (statement of Thomas Sullivan, Chief 
Counsel, Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration).  
129. H.R. 2542, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Regulatory Flexibility Im-
provements Act of 2013].  
130. Id. § 2(b)(9)(B).  
131. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995).  
132. 2 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).  
133. Id. § 1535. 
134. See Dudley, Unfunded Mandates, supra note 95, at 17 (“Section 4 of the 
Act lists seven exemptions (including, for example, for regulations that 
enforce constitutional rights of individuals, provide conditions for federal 
assistance, or are necessary for national security). UMRA’s title II 
provisions also do not apply to regulations issued by independent agen-
cies, rules for which no proposal was issued, or rules implementing statutes 
that prohibit consideration of costs. Further, mandates are defined as 
‘direct costs,’ or amounts governmental or private sector entities ‘will be 
required to spend in order to comply with the Federal private sector 
mandate,’ in contrast to the more encompassing term, ‘effects on the 
economy,’ used in Executive Order 12866.”).  
135. Robert Jay Dilger & Richard S. Beth, Cong. Research Serv., 
R40957, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: History, Impact, and 
Issues 27 (2010).  
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to federal agencies for assessing unfunded mandates and expanded 
consultation, among other things.136 “To make the executive branch 
more accountable for the goals of UMRA, Congress could provide OMB 
oversight authority beyond certifying and reporting on agencies’ 
actions.”137 
2. Amendments to the APA  
The bicameral Regulatory Accountability Act (RAA),138 first intro-
duced in the 112th Congress, would amend the Administrative 
Procedure Act. It was one of the more comprehensive legislative pro-
posals introduced in the 113th Congress and encompassed analytical as 
well as procedural changes, codifying and extending some of the 
requirements in presidential executive orders. It was reintroduced in 
2015.139 
The RAA would classify regulations into three categories: “high 
impact” rules, with estimated effects of $1 billion or more in a year; 
“major” rules, defined (as in the Congressional Review Act) as having 
impacts of $100 million or more in a year; and “other” rules.140 It would 
also cover guidance documents, which are exempt from APA notice and 
comment procedures, and classify them as “major,” and “other.”141 
Depending on their classification, rules and guidance documents would 
be subject to procedures beyond the notice and comment procedures 
currently embodied in the APA. Some of the key changes are 
summarized here: 
 High impact and major regulations would begin with an 
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), through 
which agencies would share and gather information before they 
develop an approach to address the identified problem through 
proposed rulemaking.142 
 High impact regulations would also be subject to a public hear-
ing (akin to more adjudicatory procedures conducted under the 
“formal rulemaking” requirements), where rules of evidence 
 
136. Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 
899, 113th Cong. (2013).  
137. Dudley, Unfunded Mandates, supra note 95, at 20. 
138. S. 1029, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2122, 113th Cong. (2013).  
139. Regulatory Accountability Act of 2015, H.R. 185, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(passing a House of Representatives vote on January 13, 2015, and 
currently referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs in the Senate). 
140. S. 1029 § 2. 
141. Id.  
142. Id. § 3(c).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 4·2015 
Improving Regulatory Accountability 
1048 
apply, and parties may both subpoena and cross-examine 
witnesses. Decisions must address each of the findings presented 
and be supported by “substantial evidence.”143  
 All final rules would include a plan for review at least every ten 
years, to “determine whether, based upon evidence, there 
remains a need for the rule, whether the rule is in fact achieving 
statutory objectives, whether the rule’s benefits continue to 
justify its costs, and whether the rule can be modified or 
rescinded to reduce costs while continuing to achieve statutory 
objectives.”144 
 The RAA would require the heads of agencies to certify that 
they have complied with the Information Quality Act (IQA),145 
which attempts to ensure the “quality, objectivity, utility, and 
integrity” of information disseminated to the public, and 
provides procedures by which affected parties can petition 
agencies to correct information that does not meet those 
standards.146  
As noted in the previous section, the Sound Regulation Act of 2014 
would also have amended the APA to include both procedural and 
analytical steps when developing regulations. 
3. Subject Significant Guidance Documents to 
Regulatory Review and Notice Requirements 
Various authorities have raised concerns that agency guidance 
practices are sometimes used to circumvent rulemaking procedures and 
recommended that they “should be more transparent, consistent and 
accountable.”147 To address that concern, the RAA and the Clearing 
Unnecessary Regulatory Burdens (CURB) Act148 would have applied 
regulatory analysis requirements to guidance documents that have the 
effect of regulation.149 CURB would codify OMB’s 2007 Good Guidance 
Practices Bulletin to ensure that significant guidance documents are 
subject to OIRA regulatory review as well as public notice and 
comment requirements. The Closing Regulatory Loopholes Act of  
143. Id. § 3(e), § 3(g), § 6.  
144. H.R. 2122, 113th Cong. § 3((f)(4)(G)(i) (2013).  
145. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-153 (2000) [hereinafter Information 
Quality Act]. 
146. Id. at 2763A-154; S. 1029 § 3(f)(4)(F).  
147. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB 
Bulletin No. 07-027, Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance 
Practices (2007).  
148. S. 1730, 113th Cong. (2013).  
149. Id.  
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2013150 would have required congressional approval of guidance docu-
ments.151  
4. Incentives to Reexamine Existing Regulations 
Most legislative and executive branch reforms have focused on an-
alyzing and improving new regulations, and agencies seldom look back 
to evaluate the cumulative effects of regulations or whether existing 
regulations are having their intended effects. Section 610 of the RFA 
provides for periodic review of regulations for their impact on small 
businesses, but researchers have found that most agencies “comply with 
the letter of the law for only a small percentage of their rules, and they 
rarely take action beyond publishing a brief notice in the Federal 
Register.”152 The Regulatory Improvement Act of 2013153 would have 
created a legislative commission to recommend regulations for 
modification and repeal by Congress.154 Title VI of H.R. 4304 called for 
a “periodic review and termination of regulations”155 and would have 
relied on sunset provisions and petition procedures to identify rules for 
review.  
Congress has considered using budgeting concepts to alter regu-
latory agencies’ incentives to issue new regulations and examine the 
effectiveness of existing regulations. 156  In 1980, President Carter’s 
Economic Report of the President discussed proposals to “develop a 
‘regulatory budget,’ similar to the expenditure budget, as a framework 
for looking at the total financial burden imposed by regulations, for 
setting some limits to this burden, and for making tradeoffs within 
those limits.”157 The Report noted analytical problems with developing 
a regulatory budget but concluded that “tools like the regulatory 
budget may have to be developed” if governments are to “recognize 
 
150. S. 320, 113th Cong. (2013).  
151. Id. 
152. Michael R. See, Willful Blindness: Federal Agencies’ Failure to Comply 
with the Regulatory Flexibility Act’s Periodic Review Requirement—And 
Current Proposals to Invigorate the Act, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1199, 
1200 (2006).  
153. S. 1390, 113th Cong. (2013).  
154. Id.  
155. Jumpstarting Opportunities with Bold Solutions Act, H.R. 4304, 113th 
Cong. (2014).  
156. See Federal Regulation: A Review of Legislative Proposals Before S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 124 
(2011) (statement of Sen. Rob Portman) (noting the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act would require “cost-benefit analysis of economically 
significant rules” and require agencies to select the “Least Onerous Alter-
native”).  
157. 1980 Economic Report, supra note 117. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 4·2015 
Improving Regulatory Accountability 
1050 
that regulation to meet social goals competes for scarce resources with 
other national objectives,” and set priorities to achieve the “greatest 
social benefits.”158 
The National Regulatory Budget Act159 would have established an 
independent executive office responsible for reporting annually to Con-
gress on the costs of existing regulations and the costs of proposed new 
regulations. Congress would use these data to establish binding 
regulatory caps for each executive regulatory agency.160 
The United Kingdom has adopted a “one-in, two-out” approach to 
regulation that shares similarities with a regulatory budget in that 
“departments have to remove or modify existing regulation(s) to the 
value of £2 of savings for every pound of cost imposed,”161 and members 
of the U.S. Senate are considering similar legislation currently under 
development.162 A “regulatory paygo” “would require federal agencies 
to identify and eliminate one existing regulation for each new regulation 
they want to add.”163 Regulatory agencies, with oversight from OIRA 
and either the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) or the GAO, would 
be required to eliminate one outdated or duplicative regulation before 
issuing a new regulation of the same approximate economic impact. 
Unlike a regulatory budget, agencies would only have to estimate 
costs for regulations being introduced (which they should already do) 
and offsetting regulations they propose to remove. While still subject 
to analytical challenges, a regulatory “paygo” has the potential to im-
pose some needed discipline on regulatory agencies and to generate a 
constructive debate on the real impacts of regulations. Focusing on the 
costs of regulations and allowing agencies to set priorities and make 
tradeoffs among regulatory programs might remove some of the 
contentiousness surrounding benefit-cost analysis. Congress would 
probably need to establish regulatory burden baselines in new author-
izing legislation, unless they expect those costs to be offset with existing 
regulations.164   
158. Id. at 126 (1980).  
159. S. 2153, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R. 5184, 113th Cong. (2014).  
160. Id.  
161. Dep’t for Bus., Innovation & Skills, One-in, Two-out: Statement of New 
Regulation, GOV.UK (last updated July 9, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/collections/one-in-two-out-statement-of-new-regulation# 
documents. 
162. See Federal Regulation: A Review of Legislative Proposals Before the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 172 
(2011) (statement of Sen. Mark R. Warner) (discussing his proposal “to 
improve cost accountability for federal regulations”).  
163. Mark R. Warner, Red-tape Relief for a Sluggish Recovery, Wash. Post, 
Dec. 13, 2010, at A19.  
164. See Dudley, Unfunded Mandates, supra note 95, at 21.  
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III. Legislative Branch Oversight of Regulation 
As noted above, Congress has not taken full advantage of its “‘awe-
some arsenal’ of weapons” 165  for controlling agencies’ actions. 166 
Members do use oversight hearings and occasionally use appropriations 
to limit agencies’ ability to develop or enforce regulations,167 but as 
Justice Elena Kagan has noted, “the complaint-driven nature of 
congressional oversight, especially in combination with its reliance on 
committees . . . pushes toward the ad hoc rather than the systematic 
consideration of administrative policy.” 168  Recent Congresses have 
introduced legislation that would strengthen the legislative branch’s 
own ability to control regulation. One approach would require a con-
gressional vote before major new regulations can become effective (the 
REINS Act), and another would establish a congressional office to re-
view and evaluate regulations.  
A. The REINS Act169 
The Regulations from the Executive In Need of Scrutiny (REINS) 
Act,170 which has been introduced in each of the last three Congresses, 
and passed the House of Representatives in the 113th Congress,171 is 
designed to “increase accountability for and transparency in the federal 
regulatory process.”172 It “is patterned after the 1996 CRA, providing 
expedited procedures for evaluating and voting on major regulations,”173 
but it would change the default outcome. Rather than requiring 
Congress to enact a “joint resolution of disapproval” to prevent a rule 
from going into effect, no major rule could go into effect until Congress 
enacted an affirmative “joint resolution of approval.”174  
 
165. Wilson, supra note 79, at 236 (quoting Herbert Kaufman, The Ad-
ministrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs 164 (1981)).  
166. Kagan, supra note 5, at 2257–58. 
167. Curtis W. Copeland, Cong. Research Serv., RL34354, Congress-
ional Influence on Rulemaking and Regulation Through 
Appropriations Restrictions 1–2 (2008).  
168. Kagan, supra note 5, at 2260. 
169. Although this Article discusses the REINS Act in context of its 113th 
Congress introduction, since the writing of the Article, the act has been 
introduced to the 114th Congress. Regulations from the Executive in Need 
of Scrutiny (REINS) Act, S. 226, H.R. 427, 114th Cong. (2015). 
170. H.R. 367, 113th Cong. (2013).  
171. It was also introduced in the Senate. S. 15, 113th Cong. (2013).  
172. H.R. 367 § 2. 
173. Dudley, supra note 86, at 10. 
174.  H.R. 367 § 802. 
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This would be a significant change to the current regulatory pro-
cedures and would likely change the incentives and behavior of legislat-
ors, regulators, and affected parties in positive and negative ways.175 
Opponents argue that current procedures, where Congress delegates 
regulatory decision-making to agencies, are “consistent with the 
Framers’ intention”176 and provide sufficient regulatory constraint on 
executive agencies through (1) authorizing legislation, (2) the APA 
public comment process, (3) executive branch review and oversight, (4) 
the threat of a resolution of disapproval under the CRA, and (5) judicial 
review.177 They also argue that expert agencies are in a better position 
to make complex regulatory decisions than political officials.178  
Others defend the constitutionality of the Act179 and see it as way 
to “force Members to take responsibility for the laws they pass, and to 
force Administrations to be accountable for the laws they create 
through regulation.”180 Many federal regulations being promulgated to-
day depend on legislation passed decades ago by different congresses 
focused on different concerns. The REINS Act would ensure that major 
regulations based on authority delegated years ago could only be 
adopted with consent from the current Congress.181  
 
175. For a discussion of these incentives, see Dudley, supra note 86. 
176. Sidney Shapiro, The REINS Act: The Latest Conservative Plan to Gum 
Up the Regulatory Works, CPRBlog (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www. 
progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=84F5CF0B-E804-F8D1-
7197786456C5DC4F. 
177. REINS Act—Promoting Jobs and Expanding Freedom by Reducing 
Needless Regulations: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. 90–92 (2011) (statement of Sally Katzen). 
178. Sidney Shapiro, Ctr. for Progressive Reform, CPR Back-
grounder: The REINS Act: The Conservative Push to Undercut 
Regulatory Protections for Health, Safety, and the 
Environment (2011). 
179. Jonathan H. Adler, The Regulations from the Executive in Need of 
Scrutiny (REINS) Act, The Federalist Soc’y for Law & Pub. 
Policy Studies (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications 
/detail/the-regulations-from-the-executive-in-need-of-scrutiny-reins-act; 
REINS Act—Promoting Jobs and Expanding Freedom by Reducing 
Needless Regulations, supra note 177, at 83–84 (statement of Jonathan H. 
Adler, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business Law and 
Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law); id. at 44–
45 (statement of David McIntosh, Member of Congress, retired). 
180. Editorial, The Congressional Accountability Act, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 
2011, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203525404576049
703586223080.  
181. Adler, supra note 179. 
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B. Create a Congressional Regulatory Oversight Body 
The President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness encouraged 
Congress to consider a congressional staff, modeled on the CBO or 
GAO, to review agencies’ regulatory analysis and the cumulative effects 
of existing regulations.182  
The Truth in Regulating Act of 2000183 required the GAO indepen-
dently to evaluate agencies’ regulatory impact analyses supporting final 
regulations, but this requirement was contingent upon the GAO 
receiving yearly appropriations of $5,200,000.184 These funds have never 
been appropriated.  
The Strengthening Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Actions 
for Efficiency Act185 would have created an office within the Congress-
ional Budget Office with responsibility for assessing the impact of 
federal rules and regulations.  
A non-executive branch agency responsible for reviewing regula-
tions would have several benefits.186 Most importantly, it would serve 
as an independent check on the analysis and decisions of regulatory 
agencies and OMB.187 A 1999 GAO report evaluating OMB’s annual 
reports to Congress on the benefits and costs of regulation observed, 
It is politically difficult for OMB to provide an independent 
assessment and analysis of the administration’s own estimates in 
a public report to Congress. If Congress wants an independent 
assessment of executive agencies’ regulatory costs and benefits, it 
may have to look outside of the executive branch or outside of 
the federal government.188 
While a congressional office would not have the same authority 
OMB exercises to affect agency draft regulations, it would be able to 
devote resources to areas OMB cannot, “such as examining the effects 
of regulations issued by independent regulatory agencies.”189 “Just as  
182. President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness, Roadmap to 
Renewal: Invest in Our Future, Build on Our Strengths, Play 
to Win 45 (2011). 
183. Pub. L. No. 106-312, 114 Stat. 1248–50 (2000). 
184.  Id. at 1249.  
185. S. 1472, 113th Cong. (2013). 
186. See Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, Recommendations for 
Improving Regulatory Accountability and Transparency (2003).  
187. Id. at 11. 
188. GAO, Analysis of OMB’s Reports, supra note 104, at 5. 
189. Susan Dudley, Congress Needs Its Own Regulatory Review Office, Penn 
Program on Regulation: RegBlog (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www. 
law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2011/08/congress-needs-its-own-regulatory 
-review-office.html. 
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the CBO provides independent estimates of the on-budget costs of leg-
islation and federal programs, a congressional regulatory office could 
provide Congress and the public independent analysis [regarding] the 
likely off-budget effects of” legislation and regulation.190 This would be 
particularly important if Congress enacts some of the other procedural 
changes being discussed, such as the REINS Act or a regulatory 
paygo.191 
IV. Judicial Branch Oversight of Regulation 
Under the APA, after a regulatory agency issues a final rule, an 
affected party may challenge it in court. Reviewing courts may reverse 
or remand the rule to the agency for reconsideration on constitutional 
grounds, on procedural grounds (whether the agency followed the 
procedures specified in the APA), or on the basis of the agency’s 
interpretation of the authorizing statute.  
A. Changes to the Standard by Which Courts Review Regulations  
The courts review regulations issued through informal rulemaking 
procedures under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review,192 
while regulations issued under formal rulemaking procedures are subject 
to a “substantial evidence” standard. 193  The substantial evidence 
standard directs a reviewing court to set aside an agency action unless 
the record provides “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person 
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”194 It is arguably a 
more exacting standard than “arbitrary and capricious,” which grants 
considerable deference to agency expertise. Substituting a substantial 
evidence test could motivate agencies to develop and provide better 
scientific and technical data and analysis in support of regulations.195 
Some argue that the substantial evidence test used as part of an 
informal (or even hybrid) regulatory proceeding would differ very little 
from an arbitrary and capricious test, however.196 The RAA would 
 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
193. Id. § 706(2)(E). 
194. Mareno v. Apfel, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8575, at *6–7 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 8, 
1999) (describing the evidence standard as “more than a scintilla but less 
than a preponderance”).  
195. Eve E. Bachrach, The Case for a Substantial Evidence Amendment to the 
Informal Rulemaking Provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, 55 Food & Drug L.J. 293, 297–99 (2000); Is Reform Needed, supra 
note 24 (statement by Howard Coble). 
196. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“In review of rules of 
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subject major and high impact final regulations to the substantial 
evidence standard of review.197 
B. Judicial Review of Regulatory Impact Analysis 
Presidential executive orders governing regulatory impact analysis 
have stated that their requirements are not enforceable by law198; how-
ever, several bills introduced in the 113th Congress would change 
that.199 “Judicial review could be valuable—not because the courts have 
a particular expertise in regulatory analysis but because agencies tend 
to take more seriously aspects of their mission that are subject to 
litigation. Like executive and congressional oversight, judicial oversight 
would likely make regulatory agencies more accountable for better 
decisions based on better analysis.”200  
Courts have overturned several regulations of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission as being arbitrary and capricious and in 
violation of the APA, finding that compliance with the Commission’s 
statutory criteria demanded a more rigorous analysis of benefits and 
costs to evaluate the “rule’s effects on efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.”201 
 
general applicability made after ‘notice and comment’ rule-making, 
[substantial evidence and arbitrary or capricious] criteria converge into a 
test of reasonableness.”); Matthew J. McGrath, Note, Convergence of the 
Substantial Evidence and Arbitrary and Capricious Standards of Review 
During Informal Rulemaking, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 541 (1986). 
197. H.R. 2122, 113th Cong. § 6 (2013) [hereinafter Regulatory Accountability 
Act].  
198. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (“Judicial Review. No-
thing in this Executive order shall affect any otherwise available judicial 
review of agency action. This Executive order is intended only to improve 
the internal management of the Federal Government and does not create 
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or 
equity by a party against the United States, its agencies or instru-
mentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.”). 
199. For a summary of bills, see Status of Regulatory Reform Legislation, 113th 
Congress, Reg. Studies Ctr., http://regulatorystudies.columbian. 
gwu.edu/status-regulatory-reform-legislation-113th-congress (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2015).  
200. Susan Dudley, George Wash. Univ. Reg. Studies Ctr., Prepared 
Statement of Susan E. Dudley, Hearing on Federal Regulation: 
A Review of Legislative Proposals, Part II, at 17 (2011).  
201. For a discussion of recent cases, see Jane C. Luxton, An Uncomfortable 
Wake-Up Call for Dodd-Frank Regulators, Client Alert (Pepper 
Hamilton, LLP, Berwyn, Pa.), available at http://www.pepperlaw.com 
/pdfs/ClientAlert021012.pdf. 
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C. Judicial Review of Statutory Requirements 
Congress has considered legislative amendments that would provide 
for judicial review of statutory requirements, such as those encompassed 
in the Information Quality Act,202 the Regulatory Flexibility Act,203 and 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.204 For example, the IQA does not 
explicitly provide for judicial review of agency denials of requests for 
correction, and to date, courts have chosen not to try cases that have 
been brought.205 The RAA would have required the heads of agencies 
to certify that they have complied with the IQA and subject compliance 
with the IQA to judicial review.206 Responding to concerns noted above, 
the Regulatory Flexibility Improvement Act would have provided for 
judicial review of final agency actions.207 
Congress also considered legislation (such as H.R. 899) 208  that 
would make compliance with UMRA requirements judicially reviewable 
under the APA, so that an agency’s failure to justify not selecting the 
“least costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome alternative that 
achieves the objectives of the rule”209 could be grounds for staying, 
enjoining, invalidating, or otherwise affecting such agency rule. 
Conclusion 
All three branches of government have responsibility under the 
Constitution for ensuring accountable regulation by providing checks 
and balances against each other. Over the last century, they have 
experimented with approaches to improving the outcomes of admini-
strative laws by controlling the procedures and principles by which 
regulations are generated. With concern over regulatory impacts rising, 
proposals for regulatory reform are gaining traction in the executive, 
legislative, and judiciary branches of government. The 114th Congress 
is likely to consider legislation to reform the procedures by which 
 
202. Information Quality Act, supra note 145, at 2763A-153–154.  
203. Regulatory Flexibility Act, supra note 49, at 1169–70.  
204. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48, 
70–71 (1995). 
205. For different perspectives on this issue, see James W. Conrad Jr., The 
Information Quality Act—Antiregulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions?, 
12 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 521, 538 (2003); Sidney A. Shapiro, Rena 
Steinzor & Margaret Clune, Ossifying Ossification: Why the 
Information Quality Act Should Not Provide for Judicial 
Review 1, 9 (2006). 
206. Regulatory Accountability Act, supra note 197. 
207. Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2013, supra note 129.  
208. Unfunded Mandates Information and Transparency Act of 2013, supra 
note 136. 
209. 2 U.S.C. § 1535 (2012).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 4·2015 
Improving Regulatory Accountability 
1057 
regulations are issued, clarify the decision criteria agencies use to 
develop regulations, and take responsibility for the content of individual 
regulations promulgated pursuant to statutes. While none of the major 
regulatory reform legislation considered by the 113th Congress passed, 
the bills considered there may have laid the groundwork for reforms in 
2015. Like the bipartisan, inter-branch regulatory reform efforts of the 
1970s and 1980s, which brought about unexpected innovation, higher 
quality and lower prices in previously regulated industries, reforms 
today could spur economic growth and improve the welfare of American 
families, workers, and entrepreneurs.  
